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AVOIDING "FRAUDULENT" EXECUTIVE POLICY:
ANALYSIS OF NON-SELF-EXECUTION OF THE
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
Jordan J. Paust*
It was a sad day in American legal history when President Bush
reiterated previously suggested reservations, understandings, and
declarations1 concerning the 1966 International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (Covenant),' and sadder still when the U.S.
Senate, so miserably compliant with the Executive and its failed
leadership, unquestionably accepted the Bush Administration's dec-
laration that the treaty should not be self-executing. 3 This is not
worth celebrating. Rarely has a formal attempt at adherence to a
treaty been so blatantly meaningless and so openly defiant of its
terms, the needed efficacy of its norms, and the very possibility of its
direct application as supreme law of the land. And yet this wretched
practice ultimately will not prevail. It comes twenty-six years too
late to defy a growing normative influence of the treaty and the
claims, already millions strong, to basic and effective human rights.
In its "explanation" of the suggested declaration on non-self-exe-
cution, the Executive disclosed its "intent . . . to clarify that the
* Professor of Law, University of Houston; A.B. (1965), J.D. (1968), U.C.L.A.; LL.M. (1972),
University of Virginia; J.S.D. Cand., Yale University (Ford Foundation Fellow 1973-1975); Ful-
bright Professor, University of Salzburg (1978-1979); Chair, AALS Section on International Law
(1991-1993).
1. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. EXEC. REP. No. 23, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-20 (1992),
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645, 651-57 (1992).
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, adopted by the United States Sept. 8, 1992)
[hereinafter 1CCPR].
3. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 1, at 18, 23, reprinted in 31 I.L.M.
at 657, 659 ("ITlhe intent is not to modify or limit U.S. undertakings under the Covenant but
rather to put our future treaty partners on notice with regard to the implications of our system
concerning implementation."). Too often one heard the tired ploy of the Executive that several
senators and their staff were politically opposed to meaningful ratification and the president was
simply unable to provide effective national leadership to change or overcome such an inhibiting
will. See also infra notes 113-15 (exploring Senate reaction to the treaty). Nonetheless, reality
partly is what we make of it.
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Covenant will not create a private cause of action in U.S. courts."'
Not only is such a policy anathema to the very notion of human
rights as rights of individual human beings,5 and thus destructive of
4. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note I, at 19, reprinted in 31 l.L.M. at
657. Because of the perceived thrust of this policy and other comments by former members of the
Executive branch, see infra notes 114-15, I assume, perhaps (and 1 hope) incorrectly, that "non-
self-execution" was intended by some to be basically a policy of non-execution of the human rights
documented within the Covenant, but there can be a subtle difference between "non-self-execu-
tion" and non-execution. See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text (considering the non-self-
execution provisions of the Covenant). Here, I address "non-self-execution" as a policy primarily
of non-execution. I assume that the Bush Administration's policy was part of an attempt to assure
that the Covenant will "not create a private cause of action in U.S. courts," SENATE COMM. ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 1, at 19, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 657 (emphasis added), that is,
directly. Furthermore, I assume that an attempt also was made to assure that a cause of action for
a violation of the human rights documented in the Covenant will not be allowed unless a prior or
future federal statute somehow creates or implements a right of action. But see SENATE COMM. ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 1, at 18, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 657 (stating that the United
States will implement its obligations under the Covenant through the legislature, the judiciary,
and the Executive branches). This position is actually untenable under our Constitution with re-
spect to constitutionally-based or constitutionally-mirrored rights. See infra notes 93-98 and ac-
companying text (analyzing non-self-execution under the U.S. Constitution).
It also may have been that use of such a precise expression concerning merely "a private cause
of action" was meant to save direct and private use of the rights documented in the Covenant as a
defense in civil or criminal matters, in restraint elsewise of incompatible governmental power, or
in other ways, but such is not clear when the more general limitation, i.e., the rights and provi-
sions "are not self-executing," was also used. See also Frank C. Newman, United Nations Human
Rights Covenants and the United States Government: Diluted Promises, Foreseeable Futures, 42
DEPAUL L. REV, 1241 (1993); Ruth Wedgwood, Remarks, 85 PROC., AM. Soc. INT'L L. 139, 141
(1991) (suggesting that the United States allow self-execution when utilized "in defense").
Additionally, it may have been the intent of the Bush Administration merely to state that the
Covenant itself will not directly create a private cause of action, while recognizing implicitly that
the Covenant can continue to be used in private cases arising under or through the Constitution or
federal statutes and that the Covenant, in conjunction with such other laws of the land, can be
used by the judiciary to help create, recognize, and/or define a cause of action. See infra notes 85-
87, 93-98, and accompanying text. But see infra notes 114-15. An earlier draft of this declaration
by the Carter Administration stressed that the Covenant should not be "directly enforceable," but
that "further implementation" could be left to the legislative "and judicial process." See Message
from the President Transmitting Four Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights, 14 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 395 (Feb. 23, 1978); S. EXEC. Docs. C, D, E, F, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. viii, xi, xv, xviii
(1978) (emphasis added) (submitting four human rights treaties to the Senate for advice and
consent). Others had apparently assumed that President Carter's proposal was not a policy of non-
execution, even primarily, and that such a non-self-execution policy would not be incompatible
with the object and purpose of the treaty (a second assumption that one might still question). See
Yuji lwasawa, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties in the United States: A Critical Analysis.
26 VA. J. INT'L L. 627, 669, 670 n.200 (1986). Yet the Carter language is missing from the Bush
Administration's explanation. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 1, at 19,
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 657 (adding nonetheless: "[E]xisting U.S. law generally complies with
the Covenant ...."); id. at 18, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 657 (adding in a paragraph preceding
this remark: "the U.S. will implement its obligations under the Covenant by appropriate legisla-
tive, executive and judicial means .... " (emphasis added)).
5. See generally Jordan J. Paust, On Human Rights: The Use of Human Right Precepts in
U.S. History and the Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic Courts, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L.
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the very object and purpose of a human rights treaty, but it is also
in direct conflict with the customary right of each person to an ef-
fective remedy in domestic tribunals' and in conflict with express
undertakings in Articles 2, 9, 14, and 50 of the Covenant. Addition-
ally, it is inconsistent with the Preamble and Articles 4 and 5 of the
Covenant. Article 2, paragraph 3, subparagraph (a) of the Covenant
affirms the customary and quite necessary right to an effective rem-
edy while expressly setting forth the obligation of each signatory
"[tjo ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein rec-
ognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding
that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an offi-
cial capacity." 7 President Bush's non-self-execution declaration was
apparently intended to gut this critical obligation of any meaningful
effect and, thereby, to gut the right of individuals to an effective
remedy. Indeed, how can the Executive ensure that persons have an
effective remedy if there is to be no private cause of action under
the Covenant?
Non-self-execution also would be fundamentally at odds with sub-
paragraph (b) of Article 2, paragraph 3, which imposes additional
obligations "[t]o ensure that any person claiming such a remedy
shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, ad-
ministrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent au-
thority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop
[further] the possibilities of judicial remedy." 8 If such rights to an
effective remedy are dependent upon future implementing legisla-
tion (which may or may not occur) because of this sort of Executive
action (i.e., the stated policy of non-self-execution) and/or later in-
action of the Executive branch, it is clear that the Executive branch
could not in good faith be attempting to ensure that there shall be
an effective determination of such rights by competent bodies in
cases or matters otherwise properly before them, nor could it be at-
tempting to ensure that there will be further development of judicial
remedies. Additionally, a policy of non-self-execution would be fun-
damentally inconsistent with the obligation in subparagraph (c) of
543, 611-18, 645 n.593, passim (1989) (identifying the fundamental right to a remedy); infra
notes 30, 33-35, 37, and accompanying text (examining the Covenant's object, purpose, and re-
quirement that parties provide a domestic law remedy).
6. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 5, at 611-28, 644-45 (discussing the customary right to an effec-
tive remedy).
7. ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 2, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174 (emphasis added).
8. Id.
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paragraph 3 "[t]o ensure that the competent authorities shall en-
force such remedies when granted." 9 Clearly also, implementation
of a policy of non-self-execution would make it impossible for the
United States to comply with the obligation in paragraph I of Arti-
cle 2 "to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to
its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the" 10 Covenant. Thus, the
Executive's stated policy is unavoidably at odds with five primary
obligations contained in Article 2 and with the very notion of
human rights as real rights of real human beings, a concept essen-
tial to the efficacy of rights. Article 2 of the Covenant necessarily
points to an object and purpose of the treaty that it be self-execut-
ing, that the nation-state's institutions provide effective domestic
remedies, and that these be refined as needed. The Executive's non-
self-execution policy, presently approved by the Senate, is unavoid-
ably incompatible with such an object and purpose of the treaty.
Non-self-execution also would be inconsistent with the fundamen-
tal right of each person recognized in Article 14 "to a fair and pub-
lic hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal es-
tablished by law" concerning "the determination of any criminal
charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at
law."11 Indeed, how can one have a "fair" hearing before a "compe-
tent" and "independent" tribunal concerning one's human rights if
one does not have "a private cause of action" or a right to an effec-
tive remedy before such a tribunal? A similar inconsistency exits
with respect to Article 9, paragraph 5, which guarantees that "the
victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable
right to compensation, 12 and Article 14, paragraph 6, which guar-
antees a related right to compensation "according to law" for those
improperly convicted of a crime when there has been "a miscarriage
of justi'ce."13 Curiously, one of the U.S. "understandings" with re-
spect to these treaty guarantees affirms that "the right to compensa-
tion referred to . . . require[s] the provision of effective and en-
forceable mechanisms by which a victim . . . may seek and, where
9. Id.
10. Id.; Dinah Shelton, Issues Raised by the United States Reservations, Understandings, and
Declarations, in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 269,
272, 275 (Hurst Hannum & Dana D. Fischer eds., 1993) ("[T]he Covenant clearly requires exe-
cution through domestic legal measures.").
11. Id. art. 14, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176.
12. Id. art. 9, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176.
13. Id. art. 14, 999 U.N.T.S. at 177.
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justified, obtain compensation,"14 an understanding that one can
agree with but that is completely at odds with the non-self-execution
policy.
Of additional import is Article 50 of the Covenant. It impliedly
proclaims an object and purpose of the treaty to be self-operative, or
self-extending when declaring: "The provisions of the present Cove-
nant shall extend to all parts of federal States without any limita-
tions or exceptions." 15 Clearly, a policy of non-self-execution would
be in direct conflict with Article 50 and with the overall object and
purpose of the treaty. What did the Bush Administration under-
stand about Article 50? It did not understand that the Covenant
would not be operative, but "that this Convention shall be imple-
mented by the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises
legislative and judicial jurisdiction," 6 that "the Federal Govern-
ment shall take measures appropriate to the Federal system," '1 7 and
that its "intent is not to modify or limit U.S. undertakings under the
Covenant."118 Nonetheless, its non-self-execution policy plays havoc
with each of these assumptions.
Further, by stating that "existing U.S. law generally complies
with the Covenant; hence, implementing legislation is not contem-
plated,"1 9 the Executive branch admits that there may be instances
of noncompliance. Rather astoundingly, by admitting thereafter that
no further implementing legislation is contemplated, the Bush Ad-
ministration admitted that even if there are instances of noncompli-
14. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 1, at 22, reprinted in 31 lL.M. at
659 (emphasis added) (reviewing the United States' second understanding as to Articles 9(5) and
14(6) regarding compensation).
15. ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 50, 999 U.N.T.S. at 185.
16. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 1, at 18, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at
657 (emphasis added).
17. Id. (emphasis added).
18. Id. ("[T]he U.S. will implement its obligations under the Covenant by appropriate legisla-
tive, executive and judicial means .... " (emphasis added)); see also THOMAS BUERGENTHAL.
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 228 (1988) ("Missouri v. Holland, . . . indicates that the U.S.
could constitutionally comply with Article 50 of the Covenant .. ); David Stewart, United
States Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1183, 1201 (1993) (asserting that there is no federalism reservation and if there had been, it
would arguably violate Article 50).
19. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 1, at 19, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at
657 (emphasis added); see also id. at 10, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 653 ("In general, the substan-
tive provisions of the Covenant are consistent with the letter and spirit of the United States Con-
stitution and laws, both state and federal. Consequently, the United States can accept the major-
ity of the Covenant's obligations and undertakings without qualification."); infra note 26
(appraising the Covenant's compatibility with U.S. law).
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ance, it did not contemplate acting in good faith to comply with
paragraph 2 of Article 2, which requires that, "[w]here not already
provided for by existing legislative or other measures," the United
States undertake "necessary steps ...to adopt such legislative or
other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights rec-
ognized in the present Covenant.""0 Either existing U.S. law com-
plies with the Covenant and no new legislative or other measures
will be necessary, or existing law does not comply in full and other
measures may be necessary, in which case action by the Executive
should definitely be contemplated.
Moreover, by stating that human rights recognized in the Cove-
nant, including the right to an effective remedy, are non-self-execut-
ing, the Executive branch in effect is seeking to impose blanket der-
ogations from the above-mentioned obligations in a manner
strikingly inconsistent with Article 4 of the Covenant. Article 4 al-
lows derogations only "to the extent strictly required ...[i]n time
of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation," and
then only when they "are not inconsistent with ...other obliga-
tions under international law."21 In this case, not only is the Execu-
tive's attempted denial or limitation of the fundamental human
right to an effective remedy not "strictly required" now or in the
foreseeable future, but such a denial or limitation is also unavoid-
ably inconsistent with customary international law and the human
rights protected through the U.N. Charter." The same is true with
respect to other human rights recognized in the Covenant. Thus, Ar-
20. For its failure to comply when legislation is reasonably and foreseeably needed, the United
States should itself become responsible to private claimants denied justice or the human right to
an effective remedy in domestic tribunals. Such a breach of an international obligation implicates
a customary right of action either under customary prohibitions of denials of justice or customary
human rights law. See Paust, supra note 5, at 611-28 (discussing customary rights to such reme-
dies). For a discussion of the effect of such legislative clauses and the fact that they do not operate
as inferences that the treaty is non-self-executing, see Paust, supra note 5, at 645 n.593, and
Jordan J. Paust, Suing Saddam: Private Remedies for War Crimes and Hostage-Taking, 31 VA.
J. INT'L L. 351, 366 & n.78 (1991). With respect to another treaty obligation contained in what
has been found to be a non-self-executing treaty, a federal district court has recently stated that
"[i]t is unconscionable that the United States should accede to" the treaty "and later claim that it
is not bound by it." Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, No. 92CI258, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8452, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. June 5, 1992). The court also stated, "This court is astonished that
the United States would" do something "when it has contracted not to do so. The Government's
conduct is particularly hypocritical ...a cruel hoax . I..." d.; see Shelton, supra note 10, at
276 ("If the Senate is mistaken, then implementation either through legislation or judicial en-
forcement is required").
21. ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 4, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
22. See. e.g., supra note 6, infra note 59.
1262 [Vol. 42:1257
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ticle 4 of the Covenant necessarily stands in opposition to a policy of
non-self-execution. Further, the scheme of protection from deroga-
tions contained in Article 4 is so fundamental to the human rights
treaty that a functional and blanket derogation by means of "non-
self-execution" would necessarily be incompatible with the overall
object and purpose of the treaty and should not be tolerated. 3 Addi-
23. See infra note 38 (recognizing that domestic law is no excuse for failure to comply with
international law). Addressing a 1983 Advisory Opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, Professor (Judge) Tom Buergenthal stated that the Opinion affirmed that nonderogability
and incompatibility are linked and
that a reservation that sought to exclude totally the application of a right whose sus-
pension is not permitted even in time of a serious national emergency would be incom-
patible with the object and purpose of the treaty. States would appear to be free,
however, to make reservations to rights from which no derogation is permitted, pro-
vided the reservations do not weaken the right as a whole to a very substantial extent.
Thomas Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Human Rights Court, 79 AM.
J. INT'L L. 1, 24-25 (1985) (addressing Advisory Opinion on Restriction to the Death Penalty,
Inter-American Court on Human Rights, Adv. Op. No. OC-3 (1983) Ser. A, No. 3, reprinted in
23 I.L.M. 320 (1984)). He also adds: "The nexus between nonderogability and incompatibility
derives from and adds force to the conceptual interrelationship which exists between certain fun-
damental human rights and emerging jus cogens norms." Id. at 25. The opinion stated that
a reservation which was designed to enable a State to suspend any of the non-dero-
gable fundamental rights must be deemed to be incompatible with the object and
purpose of the Convention and, consequently, not permitted by it. The situation would
be different if the reservation sought merely to restrict certain aspects of a non-dero-
gable right without depriving the right as a whole of its basic purpose. Since the
reservation referred to by the Commission in its submission does not appear to be of a
type that is designed to deny the right to life as such, the Court concludes that to that
extent it can be considered, in principle, as not being incompatible with the object and
purpose of the Convention.
Id. para. 61. Others have questioned the proper application of such a test and whether, in context,
it was politically motivated. See Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 430 (1987) (critiqu-
ing the Inter-American Court's opinion on the Guatemalan reservation). Moreover, the test seems
to be partly flawed. It is inconsistent with paragraph I of Article 5 of the Covenant, which is
similar to Article 29, paragraph (a) of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights. The
1969 Convention affirms that no state can "suppress" or "restrict them to a greater extent than is
provided for herein" versus 1966 Covenant, article 5(1): no "destruction" or "limitation to a
greater extent." American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969,
1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) (emphasis added); see BUERGENTHAL, supra note 18, at.
36. The meaning of the word "derogation" includes detraction, impairment, limitation, degrada-
tion, and disparagement. See, e.g., I THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTION-
ARY 695 (1971) (defining "derogation"). Consequently, the prohibition of derogations must in-
clude a prohibition of "restrictions." Further, the derogation clause in Article 29, paragraph 2, of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights uses the interchangeable word "limitations." G.A.
Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 135, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). As such, it
points to the obligations of signatories to the U.N. Charter and obligations under customary inter-
national law. See also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980) (declaring that
the prohibition against torture is "guaranteed to all by the Charter" and has become part of
customary international law "as evidenced and defined by the Universal Declaration"); infra notes
58-64 and accompanying text (demonstrating the incompatibility of a non-self-execution policy
with U.S. obligations under the U.N. Charter to respect and observe human rights).
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tionally, it is quite obvious that a policy of non-self-execution would
be fundamentally opposed to the object and purpose of paragraph I
of Article 5, which assures:
Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any
State . . . any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at
the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at
their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the present
Covenant."4
A policy of non-self-execution, as a valid part of the Covenant's ma-
trix for the United States, would carve out for the United States a
right to engage in such prohibited activity, and this simply must not
be allowed.
When the Executive declared that it is the view of the United
States that signatories "should wherever possible refrain from im-
posing any restrictions or limitations on the exercise of the rights
recognized and protected by the Covenant," 25 it also set up an illogi-
cal clash between such a rights-enhancing policy and its profoundly
disruptive policy of non-self-execution. If actually operative, such a
confused Executive policy could also appear to be hypocritical if we
demand of others that they refrain from imposing "any restrictions
or limitations on the exercise" of rights that are not thought to be
exercisable in the United States. What may also appear to be hypo-
critical is President Bush's statement that "[t]he Covenant codifies
the essential freedoms people must enjoy in a democratic society," 2
although application of the non-self-execution policy would actually
deny direct enjoyment of such essential freedoms and may have the
effect of denying some altogether.
Of additional import is the warning from the Lawyers Committee
for Human Rights in 1991 that a declaration of non-self-execution
is not only "constitutionally unnecessary," but also undesirable be-
cause it "would undermine one of the principal reasons why the
Constitution made treaties the law of the land and gave the Presi-
24. ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 5, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
25. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 1, at 19, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at
657.
26. See id. at 25 app. A, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 660. Understandably, the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations agreed. See id. at 3, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 649. "The rights enumerated
in the Covenant . . . are the cornerstones of a democratic society." Id. "The overwhelming major-
ity of the provisions in the Covenant are compatible with existing U.S. domestic law." Id. at 4,
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 650.
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dent and the Senate the power to make such treaties. ' 7 A recent
report of the Human Rights Committee of the American Branch of
the International Law Association also stated that "[t]he question
of whether a treaty is sufficiently precise to be directly enforced in
the courts is a doctrine initially developed by the judiciary, and it
would be more appropriate for such a decision to be left with the
judicial branch,' 28 adding that it "may well be that a non-self-exe-
cuting declaration . . . does not bind the judicial branch. '29 The
report also declared:
[A] blanket attempt to prevent United States citizens (and others) from
invoking provisions of the Covenant in United States courts is both unneces-
sary and unwise. Where Covenant provisions are too vague to be imple-
mented or where they clearly contemplate discretionary subsequent action, a
court may decline to find that they provide a cause of action. On the other
hand, where a Covenant provision is direct and sufficiently precisely formu-
lated, it would be a serious interference with meaningful implementation of
the Covenant to deprive a United States resident of the right to assert his or
her rights under the Covenant in a United States court.30
"Domestically," the report notes, "such an approach is also contrary
to the test [concerning self-executing status] developed by the
United States Supreme Court" 1 in two landmark cases, since the
Covenant certainly (a) prescribes rules by which rights may be de-
termined, and (b) such rights are protected by the treaty - factors
27. Michael Posner, Executive Director, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Testimony
Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (Nov. 21, 1991); see also Let-
ter from Michael Posner, Executive Director, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, to Senator
Claiborne Pell, Chair, Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Dec. 10, 1991) (copy on file with
DePaul Law Review).
28. Report of the Committee on Human Rights, Annex D, Committee Letter to Senator Clai-
borne Pell, Dec. 11, 1991, PROCS. AND COMM. REPS. OF THE AM. BRANCH OF THE INT'L LAW
ASS'N 1991-1992, at 98, 111 (1992) [hereinafter Report of the Committee on Human Rights]; see
also Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing"
and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties. 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 515, 516, 518, passim (1991) (argu-
ing that non-self-execution declarations interfere with judicial power). The following were mem-
bers of the Committee: Charles D. Siegal (Chair), Robert Bard, Thomas Buergenthal, Lung-chu
Chen, Christina Cerna, Anthony D'Amato, Joan F. Fitzpatrick, Thomas M. Franck, Claudio
Grossman, Sofia Gruskin, Malvina Halberstam, Hurst Hannum, Louis Henkin, Paul L. Hoffman,
Farrokh Jhabvala, Nina Lahoud, Sidney Liskofsky, Bert B. Lockwood, Stephen Marks, David A.
Martin, James A.R. Nafziger, Ved P. Nanda, Jordan J. Paust, W. Michael Reisman, Mark A.
Roy, S. Prakash Sinha, and Louis B. Sohn.
29. Report of the Committee on Human Rights, supra note 28, at I II n.26; see also infra note
40 and accompanying text (arguing that the non-self-execution declaration is not part of the
treaty).
30. Report of the Committee on Human Rights, supra note 28, at 1I1-12; see also Damrosch,
supra note 28, at 516, 518, 531.
31. Report of the Committee on Human Rights, supra note 28.
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or circumstances which, "'whenever' " they exist, are to assure self-
executing status.3 2
These views are generally shared by other legal scholars familiar
with human rights law. Addressing a related Executive policy which
arose in 1978, Professor Louis Henkin wisely affirmed that an Exec-
utive policy of not agreeing to any change in U.S. law through the
treaty would be "ignoble," "outrageous," and actually "fraudulent,"
for "[w]hat sort of convention would you have if every country ad-
hered subject to the reservation that it would not make any changes
in its laws?"33 Similarly, Professor Oscar Schachter had declared
that such a policy would be "seriously deficient and mistaken," since
it "is contrary to the basic object of the covenant, which is clearly to
have the parties adapt their domestic law as necessary to meet the
obligations of the covenant.""4 He rightly added that Article 2 of
the Covenant, in contradistinction to such an Executive policy, actu-
ally "requires the states to provide effective remedies to individuals,
and in general terms it mandates that full effect be given to each of
the recognized rights. 35 Professor David Weissbrodt has added that
the effects of a non-self-execution policy, if implemented, would be
"to deprive American courts of their most potent technique for con-
tributing meaningfully to the interpretation of the Human Rights
32. See Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344, 348-49 (1809); Report of the
Committee on Human Rights, supra note 28, at 112 n.28 (quoting Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S.
580, 598-99 (1884)); see also Paust, supra note 5, at 625-27 (discussing self-executing treaties,
tests, and practice); Paust, supra note 20, at 366-67 & n.79.
33. Louis Henkin, The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: WITH OR WITHOUT RESERVATIONS? 20, 22 (Richard E. Lillich ed.,
1981) (reprinted in RICHARD E. LILLICH. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 217, 218 (2d ed.
1991)); see also id. at 40, 70 (quoting the remarks of Hurst Hannum: "hypocritical paranoia" and
the remarks of Jerome Elkind: "in fact no legal obligation at all").
34. International Human Rights Treaties: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 85, 87 (1979) (statement of Oscar Schachter), reprinted in RICH-
ARD E. LILLICH. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 220, 221 (2d ed. 1991); Shelton, supra note 10,
at 275; see also Oscar Schachter, The Obligations of the Parties Give Effect to the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 462, 465 (1979) ("There can be no doubt that the
object of Article 2 was to require all parties to adopt measures wherever necessary to give effect to
the Covenant.").
35. International Human Rights Treaties, supra note 34, at 86, reprinted in LILLICH, at 221;
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 703
cmt. c (1987) ("Failure to provide such remedies would constitute an additional violation of the
agreement.") [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; id. § 711 cmt. a (stating that the "denial of justice"
includes a "denial of access to courts"); id. § 711 cmt. c ("[C]ustomary law includes . . . rights
articulated in the principal international human rights instruments - the Universal Declaration
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - as rights of human beings gener-
ally .... "); John Quigley, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
Supremacy Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1287, 1300-02 (1993).
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Covenants . [and] to diminish substantially the impact of the
treaties in the United States." 6 "Because much of the language in
the Covenants denotes self-execution, and because self-execution
provides an effective means of enforcement," Weissbrodt has noted,
"it is improper for the United States to assert a declaration that
categorically denies that effect."37 Indeed, Professor Weissbrodt and
Professor Frank Newman remark, "The use of extensive limitations
to minimize the effect of a treaty on domestic practices of parties
may contravene established principles of international law" which
recognize, for example, that provisions of domestic law are no ex-
cuse with respect to a state's failure adequately to implement treaty
obligations.38
It is also interesting to note that despite an apparent effort to gut
the treaty of any direct effect in U.S. domestic legal processes, the
Executive position more generally with respect to a "declaration" or
"statement" has been that such terms "are used most often when it
is considered essential or desirable to give notice of certain matters
of policy or principle, without an intention of derogating from the
substantive rights or obligations stipulated in the treaty." 9 Clearly,
36. David Weissbrodt, United States Ratification of the Human Rights Covenants, 63 MINN.
L. REV. 35, 67-68 (1978), reprinted in FRANK C. NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 590, 591 (1990); see also Damrosch, supra note 28, at 518, 532 (arguing
that the Covenant could cause U.S. courts to lose the opportunity to influence the interpretation
and clarification of the treaty globally and would leave this opportunity to foreign institutions).
37. Weissbrodt, supra note 36, at 35, 67-68; see also Burns H. Weston, U.S. Ratification of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: With or Without Qualifica-
tions, in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, supra note 33, at 27, 37-38 (criti-
cizing the non-self-execution policy of the Carter Administration); but see Arthur Rovine, Re-
marks, in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, supra note 33, at 70 (arguing
that the treaty must be implemented by legislation, is non-self-executing).
38. See Newman & Weissbrodt, supra note 36, at 589-90; see also MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET
AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 352, 361 (1980) (adding that the Covenants "do
not provide for denunciation; the commitments undertaken under the Covenants are so fundamen-
tal and intensely demanded that they are not expected to be altered, certainly not by unilateral
action"); Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate Control over
the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 624, 630 (1991) (adding:
"Reservations which purport to assert the supremacy of internal U.S. law are inconsistent with the
object and purpose of the . . . [Genocide Convention] and should be invalid as a matter of both
international and municipal law."); Schachter, supra note 34, at 465 (claiming it "turns upside
down" such a rule).
39. Marjorie M. Whiteman, 14 DIG. INT'L L. § 17, at 137-38 (1970) (emphasis added); see
also Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, Foreword: Symposium on Parliamentary Par-
ticipation in the Making and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 293, 295-96 (1991)
(stating that declarations regarding self-execution do not change treaty obligations and do not
bind courts); Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 38, at 585-86, 602, 608 (stating that declarations
do not modfiy obligations, they are mere understandings).
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 42:1257
the Executive's non-self-execution policy, if allowed, would have the
effect of derogating from several substantive rights and obligations
set forth above. Consequently, a "non-self-execution" declaration, at
least with respect to human rights treaties, is a non sequitur as a
matter of Executive policy.
More importantly, Professor Richard Lillich asks rhetorically:
"Could U.S. courts not ignore such a declaration, since it is not a
part of the treaty and hence the supreme law of the land?,"4 ° a
point picked up in the International Law Association's committee
report.41 Indeed, because of its unavoidable and fundamental incon-
sistency with several rights and obligations stipulated in the treaty
as well as the overall object and purpose of the treaty, should not
our courts also declare that this illogical policy lacks any legal rele-
vance? Under customary international law, which is also supreme
law of the land,42 whether or not the "declaration" was an at-
40. RICHARD E. LILLICH. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 229 (2d ed. 1981); see Quigley,
supra note 35, at 1301; Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 38, at 608; Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra
note 39, at 296; Shelton, supra note 10, at 276 ("It is not binding on the courts ... and does not
involve international obligations within the exclusive competence of the legislative and executive
branches."); Charles H. Dearborn Ill, Note, The Domestic Legal Effect of Declarations That
Treaty Provisions Are Not Self-Executing, 57 TEX. L. REV. 233, 245, 250-51 (1979) (contending
that such a declaration may not be part of the treaty and may not bind courts); cf. Iwasawa,
supra note 4, at 670 & nn.200, 202 (arguing that a prior draft declaration, in context, would not
have been a reservation because such a draft, in context, was "not intended to change the obliga-
tions of the United States under international law," but that such a draft declaration could still
"bind the courts" as a "condition" to the Senate's "consent").
41. See Report of the Committee on Human Rights, supra note 28, at I I I n.26.
42. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § I I l cmts. d & e, reporters' note 4; id. § 702
cmt. c; Jordan J. Paust, Customary International Law: Its Nature, Sources and Status as Law of
the United States, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 59 (1990) (discussing the origins of customary interna-
tional law and its role as U.S. law). Under the Constitution, such law is also binding on the
president. See Jordan J. Paust, The President Is Bound by International Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L.
377 (1987) (analyzing the constitutionally-based duties of the president and relevant judicial opin-
ions); Jordan J. Paust, Correspondence, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 252 (1993); cf. Michael Glennon,
State-Sponsored Abduction: A Comment on United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'L
L. 746, 751 (1992) (stating that a "presidential violation of those norms is unconstitutional" when
Congress is silent); Malvina Halberstam, A Treaty Is a Treaty Is a Treaty, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 51,
66 (1992) (stating that "the President is required to give effect to U.S. obligations under interna-
tional law, which, of course, includes treaty obligations," and thus, of course, customary interna-
tional law); Louis Henkin, Correspondence, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 100, 101-02 (1993) ("[Tlhe execu-
tive branch is no more free under the Constitution to violate customary law than it is to violate a
treaty . . . .In general, it is the President's duty to take care that the law be faithfully executed,
and that includes treaties of the United States as well as customary international law as law of the
United States," but arguing that the president "may" have "some independent constitutional au-
thority to take some actions in foreign affairs in which he has independent constitutional auton-
omy ...even if his action is inconsistent with international law." (emphasis added)); see also
Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 261 (1984) (stating that, although
political branches may terminate a treaty, power "delegated by Congress to the Executive
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tempted "reservation" to the treaty it appears to so operate,"' and a
reservation "incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty"
cannot lawfully be formulated or take effect." Thus, the declaration
appears to be void ab initio as a matter of law. This quite apt and
certain result in the case of incompatible "reservations" is all the
more appropriate with respect to an extraordinary multilateral
treaty (a fundamental human rights treaty with more than one hun-
dred signatories) formed and operative long before the United
States decided to become a signatory. Clearly, non-self-execution of
such a human rights treaty would be so fundamentally incompatible
Branch" must not "be exercised inconsistent with ...international law"); United States v. The
Schooner Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518, 533 (1841) (victorious argument of counsel for individ-
ual claimants that the "federal executive" does not have "the power of making our nation accesso-
ries to . . atrocious violations of human right"); id. at 595-96. But see Malvina Halberstam, In
Defense of the Supreme Court Decision in Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 736, 741-43
(1992) (asserting that the president should be able to violate international law).
43. See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(l)(d), opened for signature
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) (using language that, "'Reservation'
means a unilateral statement . . . however phrased or named, . . . whereby it purports to exclude
or to modify..."); RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 313 cmt. g ("Whatever it is called, it consti-
tutes a reservation in fact if it purports to exclude, limit, or modify the state's legal obligation.");
Richard W. Edwards Jr., Reservations to Treaties, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 362, 367-73 (1989);
Michael J. Glennon, The Constitutional Power of the United States Senate to Condition Its Con-
sent to Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 533, 539, 541-43 (1991); Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note
38, at 586, 588, 621, 631; cf. Iwasawa, supra note 4, at 670 n.200. If it were to operate as a
"reservation," but was not so intended, it may well be that it is severable at the international level
(i.e., that the mere "declaration" did not actually and unalterably condition U.S. consent to ratifi-
cation). If so, the predictable voiding of the intended "declaration" will not operate to vitiate U.S.
ratification of the treaty. This I assume will be the result in this instance. Indeed, one should
recognize a presumption that mere "declarations" do not unalterably condition consent to ratifica-
tion. See New York Indians v. United States, 170 U.S. I, 22-23 (1898) (holding that Senate's
"proviso," though legally inoperative, did not void the treaty - thus, the inoperative proviso was,
in effect, severable); Edwards, supra, at 373-78 (discussing whether a state can be held to have
consented to a treaty when a reservation has been ruled invalid); Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note
38, at 588-89, 597-98 (analyzing severability); Luzius Wildhaber, Parliamentary Participation in
Treaty-Making, Report on Swiss Law, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 437, 454-57 (1991).
44. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 43, art. 19(c), 8 1.L.M. at
687; Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, [1951] I.C.J. 15, 21 (Advisory Opinion of May
28); RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 313(1)(c) & cmt. c; Glennon, supra note 43, at 545-46;
Jordan J. Paust, Congress and Genocide: They're Not Going to Get Away With It, 11 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 90, 100 (1989); Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 38, at 586, 588, 608, 630-31 (stating
that reservations inconsistent with the object and purpose of a treaty are invalid). The United
States accepts the Vienna Convention as being presumptively customary. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT,
supra note 35, at 145, 147; Maria Frankowska, The United States Should Withdraw Its Reserva-
tions to the Genocide Convention: A Response to Professor Paust's Proposal, 12 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 141, 144 (1990) [hereinafter Frankowska, The United States Should Withdraw] (discussing
the customary nature of the Vienna Convention); Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties Before United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 281, 295-301 (1988) (same);
Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 38, at 574 (same).
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with the object and purpose of the treaty that it must not be al-
lowed. Clearly also, if such a "reservation" to the treaty will be void
ab initio, an attempted "declaration" of the same nature must also
be void and of no legal effect.45
Additionally, there are significant powers of the judiciary at stake
and an attempted "declaration" cannot rewrite the Constitution or
deprive the judiciary of its constitutional authority. In this case, not
only does the federal judiciary have the ultimate authority to iden-
tify, clarify, and apply treaties in cases properly before the courts,"6
but it has the same general authority and responsibility with respect
to customary international law.4 Moreover, such judicial authority
is especially compelling with respect to the protection of fundamen-
tal human rights.48 Indeed, as recognized by Chief Justice Marshall,
45. See Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 38, at 608, 631-32, 641, 643 (questioning also the
constitutional basis and effect of the Senate's conditional "declarations" and concluding that the
Senate "does not have an ancillary constitutional power to enact domestic legislation under the
guise of the treaty power").
46. E.g., Nielson v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1929) (discussing judicial power to interpret
treaties, also identifying and applying judicially constructed rules of treaty interpretation); Jordan
v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 126-27 (1928) (same); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341
(1924) (same, adding: "[The treaty] operates of itself without the aid of any legislation, state or
national; and it will be applied and given authoritative effect by the courts."); Ware v. Hylton, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 239-40, 249, 251, 253-54, 283 (1796) (stating that the Court is not bound by
private opinions of negotiators); see Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L.
760, 761-66, 772-73, 776-77, 782 (1988) (discussing judicial powers); Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra
note 38, at 582-84, 609, 632 (concluding that while the Executive and Senate statement of intent
should be given great weight by courts, "great weight does not demand blind obedience," and the
courts are the final authority for interpretation).
47. See, e.g., Paust, Customary International Law, supra note 42. See generally Demjanjuk v.
Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985) (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 667, 712
(1900)); Jordan J. Paust, Rediscovering the Relationship Between Congressional Power and In-
ternational Law. Exceptions to the Last in Time Rule and the Primacy of Custom, 28 VA. J.
INT'L L. 393, 394 n.1, 418-43 (1988). Constitutionally, such authority derives most directly from
Article III, Section 1 ("The Judicial Power") and Section 2, Clause I ("all Cases ... arising
under . . . the Laws of the United States," since customary international law is part of the laws
of the United States), and Article VI, Clause 2. See also Henfield's Case, I I F. Cas. 1099, 1100-
01 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360) ("[Llaws of the United States [include] ... [t]he laws of
nations"); RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § Ill reporters' note 4; Paust, supra, at 394 n.I, 420
n.55 (demonstrating that the judicial competence to "identify, clarify and apply international law
[is] constitutionally based"). Congress's power is only concurrent to that of the judiciary, and it is
expressed merely as a power to "define" and to "punish." See, e.g., Paust, supra, at 420 n.55.
Congress may "define and punish" offenses against the law of nations, but may not make laws
which explicitly abrogate international norms. Id. The judiciary has the power, at least in civil
matters, to directly incorporate customary international law. Id. at 437 & n.90 (stating that cus-
tomary international law has historically been "self-executing"). With respect to criminal sanc-
tions, see Paust, supra note 44, at 103 (suggesting that the prohibition of genocide is directly
enforceable by U.S. courts even without domestic legislation).
48. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 5, at 609, 611-28 (reviewing the historical enforcement of
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our federal courts "are established ... to decide on human
rights."'4 9 Thus, if the policy disclosed in the declaration is not
changed, the judiciary, applying customary international law and
the analysis above, should conclude that such a policy is recogniza-
bly void and, thus, not legally operative. An independent judiciary
could thereby assure more adequately the basic human right to an
effective remedy protected under customary international law, the
U.N. Charter, the Covenant, and, as explained below, several
amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
Importantly, Professor Lori Fisler Damrosch affirms that such a
declaration "is constitutionally questionable as a derogation from
the ordinary application of Article VI of the Constitution . ... 50
Recognizing that such a declaration smacks of a violation of the
separation of powers, she aptly adds:
Article III of the Constitution establishes federal judicial jurisdiction over
treaty-based cases, yet the non-self-executing declaration purports to tell
courts not to apply a treaty in cases that could otherwise properly come
before them. This deviation from the normal mode of treaty implementation
cannot be justified in view of the respective roles of the Senate and the judi-
ciary concerning treaties. The Framers explicitly contemplated judicial en-
forcement of treaties; they did not envision any role for the Senate in treaty
implementation, beyond giving advice and consent to ratification, and they
certainly did not expect the Senate to stand in the way of the courts' dis-
charge of a constitutionally-established function.5
Additionally, she warns that a policy of non-self-execution could
play havoc with a.proper balance and separation of powers between
the executive and the judiciary, since its operation would impermis-
sibly "remove the courts as a potential check on executive actions
contrary to the treaty. 52 This, of course, should not occur in view of
express judicial powers at stake5 3 and the express constitutional duty
of the president, which neither he nor the Senate may rewrite, to
faithfully execute the law. 4
Professors Stefan Riesenfeld and Fred Abbott have also added
their opposition to Senate attempts "to deprive treaties of their self-
human rights precepts by the courts and judicial power and responsibility to develop remedies for
their breach).
49. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 133 (1810).
50. Damrosch, supra note 28, at 527.
51. Id. at 531; see also supra note 46 (discussing judicial power and treaty interpretation).
52. Damrosch, supra note 28, at 528.
53. U.S. CONST. art. IIl, §§ I and 2, cl. 1; see U.S. Co NsT. art. V1, cl. 2; supra note 46.
54. See supra note 42.
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executing character and thereby deprive individuals of private rights
of action under them."5 With respect to a proper separation of
powers, they rightly note: "The framers of the Constitution intended
that treaties be given direct effect in U.S. law when by their terms
and context they are self-executing. An ancillary power of the Sen-
ate to deny self-execution directly contradicts this intent. ' 56 Elabo-
rating on their general theme, they write:
We believe that the Senate lacks the constitutional authority to declare
the non-self-executing character of a treaty with binding effect on U.S.
courts. The Senate has the unicameral power only to consent to the ratifica-
tion of treaties, not to pass domestic legislation. A declaration is not part of
a treaty in the sense of modifying the legal obligations created by it. A
declaration is merely an expression of an interpretation or of a policy or
position. United States courts are bound by the Constitution to apply trea-
ties as the law of the land. They are not bound. to apply expressions of opin-
ion adopted by the Senate (and concurred in by the president). The courts
must undertake their own examination of the terms and context of each
provision in a treaty to which the United States is a party and decide
whether it is self-executing. The treaty is law. The Senate's declaration is
not law. The Senate does not have the power to make law outside the treaty
instrument.5
7
Of further significance is the incompatibility of a non-self-execu-
tion policy with U.S. obligations under the U.N. Charter.5" As the
preamble to the Covenant recognizes, states have an obligation
"under the Charter of the United Nations to promote universal re-
spect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms." 59 If non-
55. Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 38, at 599, passim.
56. Id. at 599; see also supra note 46.
57. Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 39, at 296-97. But see Glennon, supra note 43, at 536-39
(noting that Senate conditions in a given case could become part of the treaty and thus treaty
law). Professor Glennon adds, however, that Senate conditions certainly cannot violate the separa-
tion of powers nor, presumably, the Bill of Rights any more than the treaty to which they might
attach. See id. at 538, 566 (adding, more generally, "not ... without constitutional limits"). On
this point, see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 303 reporters' note 4 (supporting the proposi-
tion that a Senate condition involving the president's constitutional powers would be ineffective);
id. § 111 cmt. a ([P]rovisions of international agreements . . . are subject to the Bill of Rights
and ...the Constitution, and cannot be given effect in violation of them."); Riesenfeld & Ab-
bott, supra note 38, at 591 (citing Louis Henkin, Treaties in a Constitutional Democracy, 10
MICH. J. INT'L L. 406, 417 (1989)) (suggesting inherent limits on the Senate's power to attach
reservations or other conditions to its consent)); infra note 93.
58. June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993.
59. ICCPR, supra note 2, pmbl, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173. This obligation is contained in U.N.
Charter articles 55(c) and 56. U.N. CHARTER arts. 55(c), 56. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Human
Rights: From Jurisprudential Inquiry to Effective Litigation, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227, 230, 234-
37, 239 (1981) (book review) (discussing the sources, nature, and scope of such obligations and
their application by U.S. Courts).
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self-execution were allowed as a matter of U.S. policy, it would be
impossible to conclude that the United States policy was consistent
with such an obligation to respect and to observe human rights uni-
versally and thus within the United States. Since the preamble to a
treaty is a legally relevant and useful part of the treaty, 60 one can
recognize that there has been an indirect incorporation of U.N.
Charter obligations through the Covenant's preamble into the ma-
trix of Covenant objectives, purposes, and obligations. Article 46 of
the Covenant provides another useful reference to the U.N. Char-
ter6" and, in any event, Article 103 of the Charter itself assures that
U.N. Charter obligations to respect and to observe human rights,
including the customary right to an effective remedy, will take pre-
cedence as a matter of law. 62 Because these obligations prevail in
any event, they should also be read into and condition a permissible
interpretation or application of the Covenant. They are a necessary
background to the Covenant even without preambular incorpora-
tion.6" These general points are all the more important with respect
60. Sele, e.g.. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 43, art. 31(2), 8 I.L.M. at
692 ("The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall ... includ[e] its Pream-
ble ....").
61. Article 46 reads in pertinent part: "Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as
impairing the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations" with respect to U.N. organ and
agency responsibilities. ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 46, 999 U.N.T.S. at 184-85.
62. Article 103 of the U.N. Charter reads: "in the event of a conflict between the obligations of
the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any
other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail." U.N.
CHARTER art. 103.
63. See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 43, art. 31(3)(c), 8 I.L.M.
at 692, which requires the use, while interpreting a treaty, of "[any relevant rules of international
law applicable . . .," and, thus, relevant treaty-based or customary international law. Since the
beginning of our country, the U.S. Supreme Court has normally followed this quite rational and
policy-serving approach. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2201-03 &
n.27 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding also that the forcible kidnapping of a Mexican na-
tional "unquestionably constitutes a flagrant violation of international law"); McCulloch v. Socie-
dad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-21 & n.12 (1963) (stating that an act
of Congress is interpreted partly with reference to treaty and each is interpreted partly with refer-
ence "to the well-established rule of international law that the law of the flag state ordinarily
governs the international affairs of a ship"); Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931) (in-
terpreting a treaty's terms according to their ordinary meaning "as understood in the public law of
nations"); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890) (same); United States v. Rauscher, 119
U.S. 407, 419-20, 429 (1886) (interpreting a treaty with reference to customary international
law); The Pizarro, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 227, 246 (1817) ("[T]he law of nations . . . is always to
be consulted in the interpretation of treaties .... "); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 199, 261
(1796) (Iredell, J., dissenting) ("The subject of treaties . . . is to be determined by the law of
nations"); see also Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 259, 261 (1984)
(recognizing that a Congress and Executive branch "arrangement" must be exercised consistently
with "international law" and construing the Warsaw Convention "in light of its purposes, the
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to certain rights reflected in the Covenant which have now become
not merely customary international law (which are also protected
through the U.N. Charter), but also peremptory norms as jus
cogens.64 As Articles 53 and 64 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties affirm, a treaty is void if it conflicts with an extant
or newly emerged peremptory norm of international law (jus
cogens).66 Clearly if a conflicting treaty is thereby void, an at-
tempted "reservation" or "declaration" which conflicts with a jus
cogens norm must also be void, and such is the case in this instance.
The fact that certain rights reflected in the Covenant are custom-
ary is quite significant for another reason. As customary human
rights, they are directly incorporable as supreme federal law regard-
less of the status of the particular treaty in which they are reflected,
i.e., whether or not the treaty is self-executing or has even been rati-
fied by the United States.6 Thus, even if it were not legally absurd
to conclude that the Covenant is non-self-executing, the self-execut-
ing treaty doctrine does not apply to customary international law
and therefore poses no obstacle to the direct incorporation of cus-
tomary human rights norms for use in domestic litigation. In fact,
before the United States had even ratified the Covenant, the treaty
had already been used in various federal court opinions to help iden-
understanding of its signatories, and its international implementation ["harmonious practice"]
since 1929"); Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 127 (1928) (referring to "principles which should
control the diplomatic relations of nations, and the good faith of treaties as well," as background);
Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 437 (1902) (citing international law text and principles);
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts v. New Haven, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.)
464, 489, 490 (1823) (considering jure belli as well as rules of interpretation applicable to trea-
ties). But see United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2195-96 (1992) (refusing to
interpret an extradition treaty in light of general principles of international law that prohibit the
exercise of one government's police power in the territory of another state).
64. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 702 cmts. a-f, n & reporters' notes 4-1I.
65. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 43, arts. 53, 64, 8 I.L.M. at 698-99,
703. See also Siderman v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715-16 (9th Cir. 1992) (distin-
guishing jus cogens norms from general norms of international law due to their peremptory char-
acter and finding that prohibition against official torture had attained this status); LUNG-CHU
CHEN. AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 276 (1989) (addressing the
application of jus cogens under Articles 53 and 64 of the Vienna Convention); McDOUGAL ET AL..
supra note 38, at 338-50, 360-61, 417 (tracing the development of human rights as jus cogens);
MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL.. THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC OR-
DER 105-11, 261, 394-95 (1967) (same).
66. See Paust, supra note 59, at 240, passim; supra note 41; see also Quigley, supra note 35, at
1291; Ved Nanda, The United States Reservation to the Ban on the Death Penalty for Juvenile
Offenders: An Appraisal Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42
DEPAUL L. REV. 1311, 1331-32 (stating that the United States is bound by customary interna-
tional law despite efforts to scuttle such treaties).
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tify and clarify several customary human rights that can be directly
incorporable. In the landmark opinion in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,7
the Second Circuit used the Covenant as one of several human
rights documents reflecting the customary prohibition of torture.68
The Covenant was also used in the Second Circuit in United States
v. Romano 9 to exemplify due process guarantees for those charged
with a crime under the customary "denial of justice" standard. °
The Ninth Circuit, in Lipscomb ex rel. DeFehr v. Simmons,71 af-
firmed that "[tihe constitutional right to associate with family
members . . . is so fundamental that it has been recognized in...
[among other instruments,] the International Covenant ....
More generally, the Fourth Circuit recognized that "[d]ocuments
detailing minimum standards of human rights . . . include . . . the
International Covenant . . . ., In Fernandez v. Wilkinson,7 " an
appellate court recognized the Covenant as a principal source of
"fundamental human rights," including the customary prohibition
of arbitrary detention, and that even though the United States was
not bound by the treaty, it is "indicative of the customs and usages
of civilized nations ' 5 which federal courts are bound to apply. 6
And in Forti v. Suarez-Mason,7 another appellate court used the
Covenant as an aid in the identification and clarification of custom-
ary prohibitions of summary execution and the international "tort of
'causing disappearance.' ",78 The Covenant was also used by a fed-
eral district court in California to demonstrate that "[o]ne of the
essential requirements of fairness in international law is that persons
may not be subjected to laws that make criminal, actions which
were innocent at the time"79 they were committed.
The growth of customary law will assure that other rights re-
flected in the Covenant are also directly incorporable. For example,
67. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
68. Id. at 883-84; see also Siderman, 965 F.2d at 716-17 & n.15 (relying upon the Covenant in
holding that the prohibition against official torture has attained jus cogens status).
69. 706 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1983).
70. Id. at 375 & n.l.
71. 884 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1989).
72. Id. at 1244 & n.l.
73. M.A. A26851062 v. U.S. INS, 858 F.2d 210, 219 n.7 (4th Cir. 1988).
74. 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980).
75. Id. at 797.
76. Id. at 798-800.
77. 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
78. Id. at 710.
79. Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1436 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
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by 1987, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States had already catalogued the following human rights
prohibitions, most of which are reflected in the Covenant:
(a) genocide,
(b) slavery or slave trade,
(c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals,
(d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment,
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention,
(f) systematic racial discrimination, or
(g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally rec-.
ognized human rights."0
The customary prohibition of "gross violations" is potentially
broad,8' and the Restatement also notes that its list is not exhaus-
tive.82 Also of interest is the fact that the Restatement used the
Covenant as one of several relevant treaties exemplifying "interna-
tionally recognized" and customary human rights.8 3 Additionally,
the Executive had already recognized that certain human rights re-
flected in the Covenant are customary, that corresponding legal du-
ties of governments are owed to those within their own territory, and
that such customary rights are directly enforceable in domestic
courts."'
Whether or not a particular treaty or treaty-based right is self-
executing, or even customary international law, treaty norms can
also be used indirectly as aids for clarifying or interpreting rights
contained in the U.S. Constitution, customary international law,
federal statutes, state law, or even common law. 8 5 Indeed, through-
80. RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 702. Prohibitions (a) through (f) are also considered to be
jus cogens. See id. § 702 cmt. n.
81. See id. § 702 cmt. m.
82. Id. §702 cmts. a, k, 1. The Restatement also quotes section 116(a) of the Foreign Assistance
Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(a) (1988), which adds: "flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and
the security of person .... " RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, reporters' note 10.
83. RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 702 cmts. b, f, h, I, m, reporters' notes 2, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11.
84. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 59, at 236-37 (citing examples where the United States has
used human rights treaties as "indicia of law" even without the Senate's advice and consent for
ratification); Paust, supra note 5, at 644 (reviewing instances where the United States has used
human rights treaties not yet brought before the Senate).
85. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 59, at 240-42, 244; Paust, supra note 46, at 781-82; Shelton,
supra note 10, at 277; see also Damrosch, supra note 28, at 532 (adding, "Nothing in a non-self-
executing declaration necessarily . . . prevent[s] internationally-minded jurists from applying
other sources of law . . . in a manner that will promote the objectives of international treaties");
Yuji Iwasawa et al., Remarks, 80 PROC.. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 425-26 (1986) (discussing the domes-
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out our history, human rights norms have most often been used in
this manner,8" and several federal judges have used the Covenant
indirectly as an interpretive aid even before the treaty was ratified
by the United States.87 Thus, the Covenant can continue to affect
the Constitution and other laws of the United States indirectly as an
interpretive aid, and it is likely that with U.S. ratification of the
treaty, this role, if anything, will expand. For these reasons, one of
the formal U.S. reservations to the treaty, "[t]hat the United States
considers itself bound by Article 7 to the extent that 'cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment' means the cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth
and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
tic applicability and effects of human rights treaties that are deemed non-self-executing). Impor-
tantly also, since the Supremacy Clause assures that "all treaties" are supreme law of the land,
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added), and in no Supreme Court decision has the supremacy
of treaties over state law had to hinge upon the status of a treaty as "self-executing," see Paust,
supra note 47, at 431-33 n.79, the far better view is that even a non-self-executing treaty
preempts inconsistent state law. On this general point, see SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS, supra note 1, at 17-18, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 656-57, which states that "the Covenant
will apply to state and local authorities ...." (emphasis added).
86. See Paust, supra note 5, at 593-96, passim. Human rights norms have been used especially
in connection with constitutional rights. See id. at 571-610. Additionally, there has been a use of
human right precepts in more than 140 Supreme Court opinions and in more than 1,000 lower
federal court opinions. See id. at 545, 593-95, passim.
87. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 390 & n.10 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(noting that the Covenant as well as two other human rights treaties signed by the United States
"explicitly prohibit juvenile death penalties"); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 831 n.34
(1988) (stating that the Covenant and other human rights instruments "explicitly prohibit juvenile
death penalties"); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 824 n.5 (1987) (Powell, J., dissenting) (assert-
ing that the Covenant reflects international opinion against imposing the death penalty on
juveniles); Hinkie v. United States, 715 F.2d 96, 98 n.3 (3d Cir. 1983) (considering a complaint
alleging "conduct which would violate the . ..International Covenant," and affirming: "The in-
ternational consensus against involuntary human experimentation is clear. A fortiori the conduct
charged, if it occurred, was in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States and of
the state where it occurred or where its effects were felt.") (quoting Jaffee v. United States, 663
F.2d 1226, 1249-50 (3d Cir. 1981)); Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d 876, 881-84 (2d Cir. 1980)
(relying on the Covenant and several other international instruments prohibiting torture); Rodri-
guez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388, 1390 (10th Cir. 1981) (incorporating human
rights protections without specifically citing the Covenant, although it had been used by the lower
court); Von Dardel v. U.S.S.R., 623 F. Supp. 246, 261 (D.D.C. 1985) (deciding that treatment
violated a number of human rights treaties, including the Covenant); Soroa-Gonzales v. Civiletti,
515 F. Supp. 1049, 1061 n.18 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (stating that the defendant's incarceration consti-
tuted a violation of the Covenant); Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1193 n.18 (D. Conn.
1980) (referring to the Covenant as an indication of international norms and U.S. standards of
decency); Paust, supra note 59, at 240-42 (analyzing the use of the Covenant by federal courts to
interpret the Constitution and various statutes); see also Newman, supra note 3, at 1255 (predict-
ing that there will be an impact on U.S. law even assuming the validity of all the reservations,
declarations, and understandings).
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States," '88 should not require a particular reading of those amend-
ments. Additionally, our reading of those amendments can certainly
change through time and, as noted above, can be conditioned by
international law, including the Covenant. These same general
points apply with respect to two other U.S. reservations,89 to an un-
derstanding, 90 and to a proviso not "included in the instrument of
ratification,"91 which refer to protections, constraints, guarantees,
and prohibitions under the U.S. Constitution. To the extent that the
Covenant is used by the judiciary to supplement or condition the
meaning of our Constitution, such provisions will become nearly
meaningless at the domestic level.92
More importantly, an executive policy of "non-self-execution" re-
sulting in the non-execution of basic human rights would seem to be
unavoidably unconstitutional in character and effect. First, imple-
mentation of a blanket non-execution policy would necessarily be
unconstitutional. Depending upon the particular right(s) at stake in
a given circumstance, one or more of several relevant amendments
to the U.S. Constitution can be implicated. Clearly, such amend-
ments to the Constitution place limits on executive power, including
88. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 1, at 22, reprinted in 31 l.L.M. at 659
(reservation no. 3).
89. See id. (reservation nos. 1 & 2). Reservation number I concerning the Covenant assures
"It]hat Article 20 does not authorize or require legislation or other action by the United States
that would restrict the right of free speech and association protected by the Constitution and laws
of the United States," yet such a reservation requires no particular reading of the First Amend-
ment. Id.; see also Jordan J. Paust, Rereading the First Amendment in Light of Treaties Pro-
scribing Incitement to Racial Discrimination or Hostility, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 565, 568-69, pas-
sim (1991) (noting that no particular reading of the First Amendment is required by such a
reservation with respect to treaties prohibiting racial discrimination).
90. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 1, at 22, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at
659 (citing U.S. understanding no. 1).
91. Id. at 24, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 660. The proviso reads:
Nothing in this Covenant requires or authorizes legislation, or other action, by the
United States of America prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as in-
terpreted by the United States.
Id.; see also Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 38, at 628-29 (discussing the effects of such a
proviso).
92. See generally Paust, supra note 89, at 567-69, 572-73 (explaining the possible effect of a
reservation to another treaty with reference to constitutional rights of free speech); see also Bu-
ERGENTHAL, supra note 18, at 228; Henkin, supra note 33, at 21, 25 (reprinted in LILLICH, supra
note 40, at 217) ("in principle, there are no constitutional objections. The treaty makers can
adhere to the human rights covenants. There are no constitutional objections based on federalism
or the separation of powers or on some notion that the subject is not of international concern.");
Rovine, supra note 37, at 61 (submitting that the "federal-state clause will not have much
impact").
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those powers exercised in conjunction with the treaty power93 or the
"foreign affairs" power. 94 They limit the power of the president and
other executive officials to do or refrain from doing certain acts, and
non-execution of a relevant constitutionally-based or constitution-
ally-mirrored right can violate a particular amendment or set of
amendments to the Constitution. It was not openly the policy of the
Bush Administration to violate the Constitution,95 but non-execution
of certain human rights can certainly involve infractions of the Con-
stitution. We must assume, therefore, that the Executive will not
attempt to engage in (and the courts will not allow) activity viola-
tive of human rights which are also based or mirrored in, say, the
First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, or Eighth Amendments to the Constitu-
tion.96 Such rights are (in a sense), and must be, "executed" to the
extent that the amendments also guarantee their efficacy. Thus, a
blanket "non-self-execution" policy, operative as a non-execution
policy, must not have been actually intended by the president (or
the Senate). If it had been, it would have been unavoidably uncon-
stitutional. It follows that the Executive knew or should have known
that various human rights documented in the Covenant are already
operative or executable (if not "self"-executing) through several
amendments to the Constitution.
Second, implementation of a blanket non-execution policy would
most certainly involve a denial or disparagement of the human
rights protected by the Ninth Amendment to the Constitution. The
Ninth Amendment was meant to assure the continued efficacy of
93. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957) (holding that treaties must comply with
the Constitution); Paust, supra note 47, at 393 (citing cases asserting the supremacy of the Con-
stitution). Thus, human rights protected by or under the Constitution cannot be denied or dispar-
aged through use of the treaty power, but treaties can aid in the clarification and enhancement of
those rights and guarantees. See also Philip R. Trimble & Jack S. Weiss, The Role of the Presi-
dent, the Senate and Congress With Respect to Arms Control Treaties Concluded by the United
States, 67 CHi-KENT L. REV. 645, 649 (1991) ("A Senate-imposed condition ...may not in-
fringe other provisions of the Constitution, such as the Bill of Rights. ... ); supra note 57.
94. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936) (af-
firming that the president's power over international affairs is subordinate to the Constitution);
Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 253, passim (1972) (same).
95. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 1, at 10, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at
653 ("In general, the substantive provisions of the Covenant are consistent with the letter and
spirit of the United States Constitution ..., the United States can accept the majority of the
Covenant's obligations and undertakings without qualification . . . .[Executive suggestions are]
to ensure that the United States can fulfill its obligations under the Covenant in a manner consis-
tent with the United States Constitution, including instances where the Constitution affords
greater rights and liberties ....").
96. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 5, at 571-610 (providing a general guide to such rights).
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basic human rights not documented elsewhere in the Bill of Rights
(or in the Constitution more generally), 97 and whether or not con-
ceptually such basic rights reflected in the Covenant are "self"-exe-
cuting because of the Ninth Amendment's preemptive recognition
that they are "retained by the people" or are executed actually
through the Ninth Amendment, it seems that the Executive policy
of "non-self-execution" smacks of unconstitutional impropriety,
could play havoc with the guarantees of the Ninth Amendment, and
could ultimately be unconstitutional in operation. This can all be
avoided, of course, if in actuality there is to be no denial or dispar-
agement of such basic human rights. Thus, the Ninth Amendment
compels one to understand and apply the "non-self-execution" pol-
icy in a constitutional sense, i.e., that nothing contained therein is
meant to or can be used to deny or disparage basic human rights
protected by the Ninth Amendment whether or not such rights are
executed because of or by that amendment. The human right to an
effective remedy in domestic tribunals is such a right. 8 Thus, ulti-
mately a constitutional read of the "non-self-execution" policy (even
assuming that it is not recognizably void ab initio) might recognize
that "the Covenant" itself does not directly "create a private cause
of action," 99 but the right to an effective remedy in our tribunals is
nonetheless guaranteed by or through the Ninth Amendment and
such a right cannot be denied or disparaged.
Of further interest is the fact that several federal statutes can
serve an "executing" function whether or not the Covenant is recog-
nizably self-executing. With respect to alien plaintiffs, the Alien
Tort Statute' 0 already provides such an executing function.101 For
U.S. plaintiffs, if not others, various civil rights statutes which have
97. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth Amendment: A New Form of
Guarantee, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 231 (1975), reprinted in THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND AMERICAN
LEGAL HISTORY ch. VII (Paul Murphy ed., 1990).
98. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 97, at 265; Paust, supra note 5, at 611-25 (discussing the right
to an effective remedy guaranteed by federal and international law, including the Ninth
Amendment).
99. SENATE COMM, ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note I, at 19, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at
657.
100. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988).
101. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 20, at 369 (stating that the Alien Tort Statute serves an
'executing" function); Paust, supra note 5, at 627-28, 638-43 (same in practice). The statute
helps the United States to fulfill an. obligation under customary international law to avoid a "de-
nial of justice" to aliens. See id. at 615-16 & n.479. Justice demands similar protections for U.S.
citizens.
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a purpose to protect human rights' 012 can also serve in that capacity,
and even certain criminal statutes may indirectly provide the right
to a civil action for damages with respect to certain deprivations or
prohibitions. 10 3 Other congressional legislation having a purpose to
protect individual rights that are recognizably based in international
law can serve a similar "executing" role with respect to certain
rights. For example, the recent Torture Victim Protection Act' 4
should function similarly for U.S. plaintiffs with respect to claims
against certain foreign defendants concerning torture or extrajudi-
cial killings. Indeed, a preambular portion of the Act contains the
express purpose:
To carry out obligations of the United States under the United Nations
Charter and other international agreements pertaining to the protection of
human rights by establishing a civil action for recovery of damages from an
individual who engages in torture or extrajudicial killing.
In any event, it is certainly appropriate for a court to seek to
serve a stated legislative purpose; and when that purpose includes
the preservation, protection, and/or promotion of human rights, it is
both rational and proper to look to human rights law in aid of inter-
pretation and application of the legislation. Human rights law can
provide useful criteria and content for judicial discovery and use.
This is especially so when documented human rights are sufficiently
particularized to aid in setting boundaries to shared meaning or to
give a richer, more detailed content.
Additionally, since the "declaration" appears to be legally inoper-
ative ab initio because it is-unavoidably and fundamentally incom-
patible with the object and purpose of the treaty, 0 5 it would cer-
tainly be appropriate for the new president, as a matter of Executive
policy, to change the non-self-execution policy. Efforts should be
made to persuade President Clinton to abandon such an awkward
policy and to adopt one more realistically serving of human rights
and, thus, one more consistent with overall U.S. policy. Whether or
not this is achieved, the U.S. Senate should also abandon the non-
self-execution "declaration." Since the "declaration" appears to be
102. For examples of such statutes, see Paust, supra note 5, at 567 & n.163, 598 & nn.380-81,
383-84.
103. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 20, at 369 (noting that civil causes of action can be derived
from the federal criminal statutory scheme).
104. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73, 102d Cong. (1992).
105. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (a declaration incompatible with the pur-
pose of the treaty cannot lawfully take effect).
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legally inoperative ab initio, the Senate might unilaterally (e.g., by
use of a sense-of-the-Senate resolution) recognize such a fact and
declare its abandonment of the non-self-execution "declaration."
And if the "declaration" were somehow thought to constitute a valid
reservation to the treaty,"°6 the president and Senate should act to
withdraw such a reservation,0 7 thereby allowing the United States
to comply with its other obligations under international law concern-
ing human rights. Indeed, neither the president nor the Senate can
authorize violations of international law, 0 8 and the unavoidable
clash which might otherwise be set up between a supposedly valid
"declaration"-reservation to the Covenant concerning "non-self-exe-
cution" and peremptory norms under the U.N. Charter'0 9 and cus-
tomary jus cogens" ° clearly must result in adherence to the latter
norms. Thus, even if the "declaration"-reservation were otherwise
valid, the latter norms must necessarily prevail at the international
level,"' and the president and Senate should withdraw such a reser-
vation in order to avoid an unwanted and ultimately unnecessary
embarrassment to the United States.
If such is not withdrawn voluntarily, international institutions
such as the International Court of Justice and foreign governments
desirous of assuring protection for their nationals might press the
matter or assure more formally that it is declared to be void ab
initio. Such efforts of foreign governments might even occur in our
courts and, ultimately, should prevail. Further, under Article 41 of
the Covenant, it is open to any State party to the Covenant which
has recognized the competence of the Human Rights Committee
monitoring compliance with the Covenant to receive State party
claims to bring its claim to the Committee that the U.S. non-self-
execution policy is void ab initio. This is so because, in accordance
with Article 41, the United States has recognized the competence of
the Committee to receive and consider State party claims that an-
other State party is not fulfilling its obligations under the
106. But see supra notes 43-44 (suggesting that such a reservation should not be able to law-
fully take effect).
107. For a discussion concerning such a procedure, see Frankowska, The United States Should
Withdraw, supra note 44, at 143-48.
108. Customary international law is also the supreme law of the land. See, e.g., supra note 42.
109. See supra note 62.
110. See supra notes 64 & 79 and text accompanying note 83.
I 1l. See supra note 62 and text accompanying notes 64-65.
[Vol. 42:12571282
1993] AVOIDING "FRAUDULENT" EXECUTIVE POLICY 1283
Covenant." 2
CONCLUSION
Rarely has a treaty been so abused. Someday most will under-
stand that the attempted non-self-execution policy is far worse than
abnegative and absurd; it brings serious dishonor to the United
States and should be abandoned. A country which, however imper-
fectly, has stood for centuries as a beacon for human rights sud-
denly would dim their efficacy within its very borders. Perhaps the
policy arose out of some misplaced protectionist attitude"' or sim-
ply out of an effort to cut back federally protected rights" 4 or to gut
human rights treaties of any meaningful effect in the United
States," 5 but the treaty predictably will continue to have a growing
112. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 1, at 23, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at
659 (stating in Declaration no. 3 "[tlhat the United States declares that it accepts the competence
of the Human Rights Committee to receive and consider communication under Article 41 in
which a state party claims that another state party is not fulfilling its obligations under the Cove-
nant"). I agree with Professor Newman that the Committee might take up this matter as soon as
the United States attempts to come before or sit on the Committee. Newman, supra note 3.
113. See Damrosch, supra note 28, at 515 ("neo-isolationist preferences"); Henkin, supra note
33, at 21 (isolationism); Hurst Hannum, Remarks, id. at 40 ("hypocritical paranoia").
114. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note I, at 18, reprinted in 31 l.L.M. at
656-57 (finding "no intent ... to 'federalize' matters now within the competence of the States,"
but "the U.S. will implement its obligations under the Covenant by appropriate . . . means, fed-
eral or state as appropriate," and "the Covenant will apply to state and local authorities .... "
(emphasis added)); Buergenthal, supra note 18, at 222-23, 228 (discussing the Senate's concerns
about federalism); Damrosch, supra note 28, at 519 (describing the Carter Administration's at-
tempt to deal with Senators adverse to infringing state's rights); Rovine, supra note 37, at 59-60
("Many Senators feel very strongly . . . that human rights is not a proper subject for the treaty
power . . . Such matters can and should be dealt with by local communities, towns and cities,
states, and even by the federal government."); Stewart, supra note 18, at 1184 (stating that it is a
fact that there was a "persistent thread of hostility" to ratification in the Senate). Of course, if
ducks can be protected by a treaty, as they were in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), so
can human beings.
115. See Implementation of the Helsinki Accords: Hearings Before the Comm. on Sec. and
Cooperation in Europe, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1988) (statement of Richard Schifter), re-
printed in LILLICH. supra note 40, at 224 ("[Slince the early 1950s, there has been a significant
amount of sentiment in this country against dealing with human rights issues through multi-lat-
eral treaty . . . opposition in the Senate to international human rights treaties is strong enough
.... "); Damrosch, supra note 28, at 519 (discussing the proposal of non-self-executing status in
order to increase the probability of passage); Jack Goldklang, Remarks, in U.S. RATIFICATION OF
THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, supra note 33, at 64 (stating that if the Covenant were self-
executing, "then we would have a legal nightmare. First, we would have our state laws, local laws,
and federal laws. Second, the courts would have to try to interpret how this other body of long and
complicated treaties fits in. If the treaties were law, . . . we would have to be twice as careful
.... "); Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 38, at 600 (describing the effort of some to obviate the
treaty power by denying self-execution); Wedgwood, supra note 4, at 139-40 (discussing the reluc-
tance of some to ratify the Covenant in a form which could make it directly binding as the law of
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normative influence, supplementing and conditioning constitutional
and statutory law in ways protecting of human rights.
In the meantime, efforts should be made in order to assure that
the non-self-execution policy is abandoned. If the president or Sen-
ate does not do so, predictably our courts or other institutions might
be utilized in order to obtain formal recognition that the policy is
legally void ab initio. For any of several reasons addressed above,
such a formal recognition should not be difficult to obtain. The non-
self-execution policy is not only incompatible with the preamble to
and several articles in the Covenant and with the overall object and
purpose of the treaty, but also with the very notion of human rights
as real and effective rights of real human beings. Additionally, it is
incompatible with peremptory norms under the U.N. Charter and
customary jus cogens. For this reason also, and as a matter of inter-
national law, the non-self-execution policy cannot prevail. And I will
go this far - as long as the policy remains, so long is there proof
that in this instance our government is not functioning as one of, by,
and for, the people of the United States. Certainly it is not in our
interest to deny to ourselves and our posterity the rights of human
beings.
If these were not sufficient reasons for abandoning the policy, it is
evident that non-execution of basic human rights is at odds with the
Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and, depending upon
the rights at stake, possibly other amendments which restrain Exec-
utive power. Consequently, an attempted non-execution policy with
respect to human rights is unavoidably unconstitutional in character
and effect and must not be pursued under the guise of "non-self-
execution." Further, because of such constitutional guarantees, the
courts must interpret the policy (even assuming its survival) in a
constitutional sense - i.e., so as not to allow the denial or dispar-
agement of any human right protected by or under the Constitu-
tion. 16 The human right to an effective remedy in domestic tribu-
nals is such a right. Additionally, the president and Senate cannot
deprive the judiciary of its constitutional authority. Non-self-execu-
tion of human rights that are otherwise directly incorporable would
attempt to do just that and, as a matter of separation of powers,
the land).
116. When courts play their necessary role, let us celebrate the defeat of non-execution, the
triumph of our Ninth Amendnent, of justice, humanity, and remedies for wrong.
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must not be allowed.117 Such an impermissible interference with ju-
dicial authority pertains especially with respect to the human right
to an effective remedy in domestic tribunals.' 18
Or what man is there of you, whom if his son ask bread, will he give him a
stone?
Matthew 7:9
117. The judiciary cannot be deprived of its constitutional authority. See supra notes 46-57 and
accompanying text
118. See Paust, supra note 5, at 609, 611-28, 644; supra note 49 and accompanying text.

